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Introduction
In recent years, scholarship on transpacific exchange in colonial Latin America has
expanded and deepened, particularly with reference to the trade of silver for moveable
goods produced in Asia such as silk, porcelain and ivories, and the implications of that
exchange for local cultural production both in the Americas and in the western Pacific.
Although these emphases are understandable, they risk overshadowing another factor
that also shaped the transpacific as a zone of interconnection and interactivity: war, and
particularly conflict between Spain and one of its chief imperial rivals, Britain. The
empires of Spain and Britain clashed frequently in the early modern period, and in the
eighteenth century Britain’s increasingly global approach to inter-imperial war repeatedly
brought such conflict into the Pacific. During The War of Jenkins’ Ear or Guerra del
Asiento (1739–1748), for example, George Anson sacked and burned the town of Paita,
in Peru, before crossing the Pacific and ultimately seizing the Manila-bound Nuestra
Señora de Covadonga in June of 1743. And, only decades later during the Seven Years’
War (1754–1763), British forces captured both the city of Manila and the Acapulco-
bound Santísima Trinidad in 1762. To be sure, Britain’s militarised turn to the Pacific
did not signal an end to its attacks on more traditional targets: in 1762, British forces
also took the city of Havana, and during every war in the century British naval ships
and privateers attacked and seized Spanish vessels in the Atlantic (indeed, in 1779, one
of Spain’s first losses after its entry into the U.S. War of Independence was the urca
Santa Inés, returning from Manila via the Cape of Good Hope). Thus, despite its geo-
graphical remoteness from, and other differences to cities in the Americas, Manila and
its inhabitants shared an experience common to colonial Spanish American history in
its exposure to war with Britain.
A full account of that shared history is beyond the scope of this essay, but a more
limited consideration of Anglo-Spanish war in the context of a volume on transpacific
exchange has two potential advantages, the first being that it adds a new dimension to
the study of economic issues. On the one hand, analysing conflict allows the transpacific
to be interpreted not only as a space for the circulation of silver and goods within the
Spanish Empire (or between it and trading partners such as Chinese merchants), but
also as a space in which sudden disruptions to that flow took place. For example, when
Anson captured the Nuestra Señora de Covadonga, it was carrying the year’s supply of
silver destined for Manila: ‘1,313,843 pieces of eight, and 35,682 oz. of virgin silver’
(Walter 1928, 349–60, 363). For the wide circle of people in the Philippines, colonial
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Spanish America, and Spain with interests in this shipment or the goods to be made or
exchanged for it (or for those who had to labour to replace it), such a large and abrupt
loss was surely of consequence. On the other hand, the inclusion of war in studies of
Pacific exchange also allows, perhaps counter-intuitively, for moments of disruption
within the Spanish imperial economy to be seen as episodes of interconnection or conver-
gence between the Spanish imperial and British imperial economies—episodes, moreover,
in which the sudden arrival of surplus into the British economy accelerated exchange
between Britain and its trading partners and within Britain itself. Or, to put it more con-
cretely, in Anson’s hands silver that had been extracted and processed in Peru or New
Spain and which normally would have been used (among other things) to buy Chinese
goods which would have been sent to Acapulco and bought by consumers in New
Spain (among other places), was instead used by Anson to buy Chinese goods (notably,
a large porcelain service) destined for Britain—as well as to commission a host of
British artistic and architectural products and services (such as the lavish up-scaling of
his brother’s country house, Shugborough Hall). In turn, recognising these intersections
has the potential to influence wider debates in global history. For if, as the editors note,
‘the importance of Spain’s trans-Pacific exchange has been largely eclipsed by studies of
the later empires of the Dutch and the British,’ it is also the case that those studies of
the British Empire—and the intersecting, voluminous literature on British consumer
culture—tend to ignore not only Spain’s transpacific exchange but even the very existence
of the Spanish Empire, let alone to recognise Anglo-Spanish interaction, or takings from
Anglo-Spanish conflict, as factors in the British ‘pursuit of luxury.’1
Pairing the analysis of war with the analysis of exchange can also shed light on war
itself. Here, two topics will be explored. The first is the disrupted circulation of a category
of objects—for example, maps, pilots, and manuscripts—whose primary value lay not in
their monetary or commercial worth, but in the intelligence they conveyed. Second, these
processes involvingmoveable forms will be linked to processes involving immovable forms
such as landscape and architecture. Including immovable forms is important because war
subjected them to the same processes of physical disruption and transfer enacted upon
silver and moveable objects, as British personnel seized building materials or pried
pieces from structures for military or personal gain. But the war—and the security
panic that followed the British capture of Manila—also set in motion longer-term archi-
tectural processes. Chief among these was the radical reconfiguration of Manila’s built
environment, which before the invasion had been characterised by the close proximity
of the walled city to a ring of extramural towns inhabited by multi-ethnic populations
and strongly influenced by the Catholic religious orders. During a decades-long period
of extramural clearance and intramural fortification, this urban form was replaced with
a walled city starkly partitioned from its suburbs by a blank security crescent emptied
of buildings and people.
1762
Let us turn, then, to the 1762 British expedition toManila, which intersected with events in
the Americas in at least two ways. First, as noted, the expedition to Manila was undertaken
together with an attack on Cuba by British forces. Second, the two British attacks of 1762
36 J. M. MANCINI
were methodologically interconnected in the sense that, in both cases, British personnel
prioritised not the permanent transfer of territory—indeed, after the war, captured terri-
tories in Cuba and the Philippines reverted to Spanish rule—but rather, the way that war
could engender surplus transfer. To be sure, in this respect the Havana and Manila
expeditions (and, perhaps, most British actions against colonial Spanish America) were
not only like each other, but different from the kind of war Britain waged against its
other rivals. As historians have intensively documented, for instance, Britain’s war
against France in North America during the same conflict was a ‘contest for continents’
aimed towards permanent territorial gain.2 As I have argued elsewhere (Mancini 2011),
Britain’s specialised approach to Anglo-Spanish conflict owed much to Anson’s influence.
After his return from the Pacific, Anson became a celebrity, whose many attendant images,
objects, and texts not only spread his fame and popularity, but legitimatised and advocated
the approach to imperial conflict he had taken in the temporary seizure and looting of
Paita and the capture of the Covadonga. As important, his exploits fuelled his rapid rise
through the naval hierarchy, giving him both power and the ability to dispense patronage.
This culminated in his service, as First Lord of the Admiralty, in the single most influential
naval position in the British Empire—a position from which he supervised both the
Havana and Manila expeditions.
In the Philippines, this prioritisation of surplus transfer over permanent territorial gain
was manifest in the zeal with which Admiral Samuel Cornish, leading the British fleet,
pursued the taking of prize. Indeed, even before the expedition had succeeded in its
mission to capture the city, Cornish diverted two of his ships away from the task to
chase the Philipina, due from Acapulco with a 3-million dollar cargo of silver. In his
letter to Anson, Cornish represented this decision through an appeal to Anson’s own
history in the region that cast Cornish’s leadership (and specifically, his decision to
assign one of Anson’s former subordinates, Hyde Parker, to this task) almost as the
expression of an Ansonian will:
I gave Captain Parker an order to command the Panther, as she was a Clean ship, and joyn’d
the Argo with him to go in quest of the Galleon St. Philippina who was at Cajayagan between
the Bocadera & Cape Spiritu Santo the 10th of Sept.; and proposed remaining there till the
Monsoon was broke up; As Capt. Parker was with your Lords[hi]p and is very well
acquainted with those seas I have the most sanguin[e] hopes of his success.3
Cornish turned out to be right: after the war Parker would himself interpret his own
actions specifically in these terms, when he wrote that he had ‘endeavoured to follow
the footsteps of my Noble patron and excellent friend [Anson] whose zeal for the
honour of his Country and affection to the sea Service ought to endear his memory to
every sea officer.’4 Cornish also correctly predicted Parker’s success in the quest to repli-
cate Anson’s seizure of the Manila galleon. Although Parker did not find the Philipina
because its captain, having been alerted to the British attack, had beached it on the
Pacific shore of Luzon (thus enabling the leader of the resistance to the invasion, Simón
de Anda y Salazar, to provision and pay his supporters), on 30 October the Panther
and Argo did capture the Acapulco-bound Santísima Trinidad (Dreaper 2006).
Once the city was captured, British personnel continued to prioritise the transfer of
surplus, not only gaining the promise of a ransom of four million dollars through the
agreement of terms of capitulation, but also thoroughly looting Manila’s public buildings
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and religious houses. As suggested above, this looting targeted both moveable goods (for
instance, silver liturgical objects), as well as elements of the city’s architectural fabric.
Indeed, even months into the occupation, British officers were attempting to hold to
ransom the bells of the convent of Santa Clara; when that failed, as the nuns recounted,
‘the English proceeded in the extraction of the bells of Sta. Clara with such vigour that
they did not even spare the small one from the cloister.’5
This prioritising of material gain paralleled events in Havana, where British officers
employed both legal and extralegal means (if not looting) to do so. Hence even while
Britain returned Cuba to Spain via the 1763 Treaty of Paris, British personnel retained
their individual gains. The expedition’s leading naval officer, Admiral George Pocock,
for example, received 299,993 dollars and 2½ reales (£122,697)—within a naval share
that totalled 899,980 Spanish dollars (approximately £375,000). This was distributed
amongst 14,499 men—including 42 captains who each received 4821 dollars 2½ reales
(nearly two thousand pounds) (Syrett 1970, 297–98; García del Pino 2002). This, in
turn, was matched by another £122,697 paid out to Pocock’s ground forces counterpart
General George Keppel, the 3rd Earl of Albemarle—and another 899,000 distributed to
the ground forces. And even beyond that, Albemarle also extorted a substantial
‘present’ of an additional hundred thousand dollars from the Bishop of Santiago de
Cuba, D. Pedro Agustín Morell de Santa Cruz.6
Divergent fortunes
The capture of Manila did not leave the city permanently in British hands, but it, and the
seizure of the Santísima Trinidad, inflicted significant collective and personal losses none-
theless. In July of 1763, shortly after the cessation of hostilities, the engineer Miguel
Antonio Gómez described conditions in the Philippines to the Secretary of State for the
Indies, Julián de Arriaga: ‘Commerce completely annihilated; temples robbed, the
houses destroyed, possessions lost and the families without shelter, having lost their
Fathers, Husbands, and Brothers, some to the blade of the sword of the Englishman,
and others to the cruelty of bandits, and faithless Indians, and to agitators.’ Indeed,
Gómez spoke from bitter personal experience, having lost in the conflict ‘many
memoirs and observations that I had gathered, regarding the Geography and natural
history of these lands’—and, in the captured Santísima Trinidad, a letter that (Gómez
assured Arriaga) the governor had written on his behalf after elevating him to the rank
of Captain of Infantry and Ordinary Engineer, asking for Arriaga’s approval to increase
Gómez’s pay.7
Gómez was not alone in this experience of wartime loss. The oidor Pedro Calderón
Henríquez, for example, had been on board the Santísima Trinidad en route to Acapulco
when it was captured, and his treatment caused him to present a strongly worded protest
to the East India Company’s governor of the occupied city, Dawsonne Drake. Several
aspects of this episode outraged Calderón Henríquez, who lost a personal fortune of
thirty thousand dollars in the affair: his detention in Cavite for nineteen days; the
breach of normal Spanish and British protocols that would have provided, during the
prize adjudication, for his maintenance according to his ‘Rank & quality’; and the fact
that, even though no inventory had been taken, ‘the Admiral [Cornish] has declared
himself a party in ordering the ship to be unladen, and the Jewells found aboard her, to
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be disposed [of], without giving notice to the persons concerned; my Desks, bundles, &
chests were broken open, and many things of great Value taken out of them and
landed at Cavite.’ This, Calderón Henríquez insisted, ‘transgressed against all the ordi-
nances of the Marine.’8
Beyond personal losses of moveable goods, others noted the detrimental effects of the
British way of war on Manila’s built fabric—for example, their undoing of royally decreed
building projects that had been under way (and in some cases were nearly complete) at the
time of the invasion, such as works on the Royal Hospital. Thus in June of 1764, the
interim Governor, Francisco Javier de la Torre, recounted to Arriaga that work had
been ‘cracked by the reciprocal fire of war’ and damaged by being left uncovered
during the conflict. But he also emphasised the harm inflicted by the predations of
English soldiers: ‘While they stayed in this city,’ he wrote, ‘the English took the collected
[building] materials’ and applied them to ‘their defence and fortification, taking apart the
offices in the Hospital that were being repaired.’9
In contrast to these stories of loss, humiliation, and regression, several of the higher-
ranking British officers who participated in the Manila expedition experienced lavish
gains. For example, Hyde Parker received a £10,000 share of the prize from the Santísima
Trinidad, including a large number of Chinese porcelains such as a pair of Kangxi-era jars
with domed covers, decorated in iron red and gilt (Melford Hall, Suffolk, England). More-
over, although Parker was the son of a Church of England clergyman whose family tree
included the royalist Bishop of Salisbury, Alexander Hyde, he also held on to another
kind of object that would have been common in eighteenth-century Spanish America
but very rare in eighteenth-century Britain: Philippine-made Catholic devotional
figures. Hence the estate bought by Parker’s son, Melford Hall, still displays a large
ivory processional figure of the Santo Niño or Holy Child and a figure of the Virgin of
the Immaculate Conception (see also [Garnett] 2005). Moreover, Parker’s prize-taking
also facilitated the further commissioning and acquisition of works of art and architecture
in England by Parker and his family—including both Asian objects such as a set of armor-
ial china with the Parker arms, and works by English makers. Thus, Parker’s emulation of
Anson extended beyond his wartime actions, to his post-war use of the proceeds of war.
British enrichment from temporary Pacific conquest extended beyond the acquisition
of valuable objects to the making of fortunes. With his share of the Santísima Trinidad
prize, for instance, Cornish was able to acquire a landed estate in Bedfordshire in 1765,
which included the manors of Sharnbrook, Tofte, and Temple-Hills (Lysons and
Lysons 1908, 130–31); with the support of the duke of Norfolk, he gained election as
MP for Shoreham, and in 1766, he was made a baronet (Laughton rev. Tracy). And the
leader of the ground forces, William Draper, was able to overcome years of worries
about money. As his biographer James Dreaper notes, these worries had been so acute
that, after the successful defence of Madras against the French in 1759, Draper had
exclaimed to a friend and fellow officer: ‘Pox take the poverty of these Frenchmen.
I shall not be able to scrape up a winter’s play at Arthur’s.’ In contrast, he was able to
leave Manila with a £5000 draft drawn upon the East India Company, which had
assumed control of the city after its capture. With this, Draper was able not only to
avoid penury, but to build a spacious country house near Bristol he called ‘Manilla
Hall,’ to erect an obelisk and sarcophagus commemorating his superiors and subordinates,
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and to commission a handsome portrait of himself by Thomas Gainsborough (ca. 1765;
Fine Arts Museums of San Francisco).10
In both of these aspects—the British legacy of gain and the transformation of that gain
into art and architecture—the Manila campaign once again intersected not only with
Anson’s prior campaign in (and return from) the Pacific, but also with the Havana
expedition. As noted, the capture of Havana brought about a vast payout for Albemarle
—and for Albemarle’s younger brother, Augustus, Viscount Keppel, a former Pacific sub-
ordinate and lifelong protégé of Anson’s who received a £25,000 share. After the capture of
Havana, at least some of the Keppel family’s windfall went to commission the Franco-
British artist Dominic Serres (1722–1793) to make a series of paintings of the city’s
capture and occupation, including The Piazza at Havana (ca. 1765–1770; National Mar-
itime Museum, Greenwich, London). Thus while the expedition did not permanently
bring the ‘real’ city of Havana into the British Empire, it did bring representations of it
into the art and homes of the imperial elite—just as the Manila expedition built
‘Manilla’ into Draper’s ‘Manilla Hall’ (and, even with the demolition of that structure,
into Bristol’s ‘Manilla Road’).11
Insecurity
In a sense, then, the Manila expedition—and, more specifically, the British pursuit of a
method of warfare that prioritised material transfer—disrupted not only the individual
material fortunes of Manila’s people and its collective built fabric, but also what might
be thought of as the ‘balance of fortune’ between Spain’s subjects in Manila and their
British counterparts. Yet, the Manila expedition also had another important disruptive
legacy: the sudden collapse of Spain’s superior knowledge of the transpacific, including
Manila itself, and a corresponding rise in British intelligence.
This convergence in intelligence was also a product of British methodologies during the
war. Recall that, in this era, sensitive information could be embedded within unique
material forms (such as manuscript maps and pilots) whose viewing, copying and circula-
tion could be controlled, and emplaced within specific repositories to which outsiders did
not normally have access. British officers knew this, and used armed conflict as a tool to
gain access to its rivals’ ‘intelligence objects.’ Hence, during his cruise for transpacific
prize, Anson specifically sought out maps and other papers that could be obtained from
Spanish vessels, as well as objects and materials of monetary value; so, too, in the
Manila expedition of 1762, when British personnel engaged in the large-scale taking of
manuscripts, images, rare printed books, and other objects which archived, condensed,
and represented geographical, hydrological, historical, and other knowledge of Manila,
the Philippines, and the wider transpacific.
For obvious reasons—including Draper’s vehement campaign to deny that looting had
taken place—this hoard of ‘intelligence objects’ is somewhat difficult to catalogue. None-
theless, a number of items in the British Library (and in other repositories including
Indiana University’s Lilly Library) may be identified as having definitely or likely exited
Manila as a result of the expedition. One example is a manuscript in the British Library
that had belonged to Manila’s Augustinians, the ‘“Libro de Consultas,” or Chapter-book
of the Convent of St. Paul at Manila; 10 Aug. 1751–14 Dec. 1761.’ As a helpful note in
pencil explains, ‘This M.S. which affords a curious illustration of the […] government
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of a monastery in the Spanish Colonies was part of the plunder of Manila when that town
was sacked by the English Squadron under the command of Sir Wm Draper. It belonged
[…] to [Alexander] Dalrymple hydrographer to the Admiralty.’12
Similarly, the British Library also possesses a 1751 manuscript made through the col-
laboration of Francisco Alegre, a Manila pilot, and Joseph de la Concepción, rector of the
Augustinian Recollects of the Province of San Nicolas de Tolentino—a province that, like
that of the Augustinians, had registered complaints of pillage with the British authorities.
In this case, it is easy to grasp why the manuscript would have appealed to the intelligence-
(and beauty-) seeking looter, as it contained not only Concepción’s ‘account […] of the
Origin, Progress, and state of said Province, and of the Religious, who have worked in
it since the year 1606, until the present year of 1751,’ but also Alegre’s manuscript
maps, each coloured in blue, red, and other shades, backed with an undyed woven
fabric, and finished with a blue-dyed woven edging. These, in turn, contained important
navigational data such as the location of anchorages, forts, and rocks.13
Rare books in the British Library appear to tell a similar story. An example is its
copy of Admiral Joseph González Cabrera Bueno’s Navegacion especulativa y practica.
Like the Concepción-Alegre manuscript, this work was also the result of collaboration
between religious and military personnel, as it was published at Manila’s Franciscan
convent of Nuestra Señora de los Angeles in 1734. Because this is a printed work, it
is somewhat more difficult to assert that it passed into the British Empire in 1762—a
few other copies of it do exist in libraries beyond the boundaries of the former
Spanish Empire. However, the British Library’s vellum-bound copy has on its title
page the signature of the Jesuit polymath Pedro Murillo Velarde, a long-time Manila
resident (Figure 1). This suggests that the volume had been Murillo Velarde’s personal
property and thus had resided in one of Manila’s Jesuit institutions before arriving in
Britain. Moreover, there is a plausible vector for the transfer of the Navegacion especu-
lativa y practica to Britain as a result of the expedition. In addition to the devotional
ivories and porcelains Parker acquired from the Santísima Trinidad, he also possessed
upon his return to Britain ‘books charts and Manuscripts which I collected during my
service in the expedition against Manilla.’ These included ‘the Cronicas de San Gre-
gorio,’ a reference to the Franciscan province, works by ‘the Jesuits Colin [and]
Murillo [Velarde] and some other writers,’ and ‘the Manuscripts of Don Antonio
Porez Gil, the Admiral Cabrera Bueno[,] Don Manuel Corea, and the Spanish
printed instructions to the Generals of ther Galeons.’ Although Hyde Parker described
his Cabrera Bueno as a ‘manuscript,’ this may possibly be attributed to its binding in
limp vellum, a practice that was commonly applied to Spanish printed texts of the
eighteenth century but that in England was by that time more frequently reserved
for manuscripts.14
To get a sense of what was potentially at stake in the transfer of such objects, it is also
necessary to reflect upon the state of British knowledge of (and capacity to represent)
Manila, the Philippine archipelago, and the transpacific. Here it may be said that, prior
to the 1762 expedition, British capacity in this area had been quite deficient compared
to their knowledge of the Atlantic or ports in Spanish America. William Hacke’s 1700
map, ‘Luconia,’ had only indicated the very general location of Manila, omitting the
eastern reaches of Luzon, the Embocadero de San Bernardino, and any other details
that would facilitate an approach from the Pacific. Moreover, the map of Manila that
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appeared in the lavishly illustrated, and generally highly detailed account of Anson’s trans-
pacific expedition, Richard Walter’s 1748 Voyage round the World, had done little more
than gesture towards the general shape of the city. And when British mariners had
sailed to Manila from India in 1762, they had not drawn upon British charts to make
their approach. Rather, they seem to have relied on a single Spanish image: ‘Murillo
[Velarde]’s chart of the Philippines’ (his 1734 Carta hydrographica y chorographica de
las Yslas Filipinas). Indeed, Parker insisted that this map had been taken by Anson
himself from the Covadonga, and that Anson had ‘sent [it] out by the Argo’ for use in
1762.15
Figure 1. D. Joseph González Cabrera Bueno, Navegacion especulativa y practica, 1734.
© British Library Board, 8805.g.2.
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The Manila expedition dramatically altered these circumstances. Suddenly, British
draughtsmen had the chance to observe the city and bay of Manila directly, and gained
the ‘opportunity of proving’ Murillo Velarde’s map against the features it depicted
(Parker ‘found it drawn with great exactness and fidelity’). But, as important, their seizures
during the campaign also gave British officers durable access to a wealth of information
that had already been synthesised and represented in visual, narrative, and tabular
format. Cabrera Bueno’s Franciscan-published volume, for example, contained derrotas
for the route across the Pacific between Acapulco and the Philippines (and between
Spain and the Philippines via the Cape of Good Hope, Mozambique, and Malacca); the
west coast of the Americas from Cape Mendocino to Acapulco, from Panama to Acapulco,
and from Panama to Callao; and for the treacherous westward approach into Cavite from
the Pacific via the Embocadero de San Bernardino.16
The British were also inclined to translate and re-synthesise that information in ways
that advantaged their empire. Hence after his return Parker wrote, of the ‘books charts
and Manuscripts which I collected during my service in the expedition against Manilla,’
that the ‘principal object of my design was from these materials to form a directory for
the Navigation of the Archipelago’—a task which was desirable because ‘the navigation
coasts and productions of the Phillipine [sic] Islands are matters so little known
amongst us that I conceive I cannot employ my leisure hours more to the public advantage
than by giving the best account I can of them,’ and because, ‘had the Geography and
strength of these Islands been better understood before our late expedition I am perswaded
the success of it might have been more complete.’ And, with Cabrera Bueno’s volume in
his possession, Parker was able to produce new accounts in English of the Pacific approach
to Cavite via the Embocadero, and of the Pacific coast of North America from Acapulco to
Mendocino. This had the potential to facilitate a British assault on the Philippines via the
Pacific, instead of from India, and to assist a British campaign to secure new California,
which was appearing on British maps as ‘New Albion discover’d by Sr. F. Drake 1578.’17
Similarly, Dalrymple appreciated the usefulness of abstracts of voyages ‘from the Phi-
lippine Islands to New Spain, made in the years 1699–1740; from originals in the public
archives in Manila.’ These presented him with a catalogue of detail regarding the latitude
and longitude Spanish vessels had followed along particular voyages; the dates they had
embarked, landed, and sighted certain landmarks; the kinds of things that they had
observed in addition to land, such as birds, wood, seals, or seaweed; and the characteristics
of various coastal features—all of which exposed both the complex mechanics of the trans-
pacific crossing and the likely location of Spanish ships en route. Hence after making
annotations in the margin of these extracts, Dalrymple compiled his own manuscript in
English of extracts of the Spanish abstracts.18
The intelligence revolution wrought by the Manila expedition also exacerbated risks to
Manila itself by greatly simplifying the process whereby British actors identified and rep-
resented its buildings, thoroughfares, and points of weakness. Consider, for example,
another item that circumstantially appears to have entered British hands through
wartime seizure: Antonio Fernández de Roxas’s ‘Topographia de la ciudad de Manila,
capital de las yslas Philipinas’ (Figure 2). This incredibly detailed image was far too com-
prehensive to have been circulated in Britain before the conflict: for example, the then
state-of-the-art American Gazetteer, published just as the Manila expedition was being
launched, appears to have drawn its information on Manila—which, tellingly, appeared
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in the Gazetteer’s entry for Acapulco—from Anson’s map. Hence, it asserted that ‘at the
beginning of the last war [Manila] was only an open place, its principal defence being a
small fort.’ Further, the Roxas map was lodged in King George III’s topographical collec-
tion in sequence with the first British-drawn map of the city. And finally, it bears the
inscription, in English, of the location of British batteries and the ‘Breach’ of the city
walls at Bagumbayan. This suggests the Roxas topography may have been used by return-
ing officers to present an account of the expedition to officials in London. Indeed, it is not
too much of a stretch to imagine this materially enhanced account of British victory in the
Pacific being made by Cornish’s representative, Richard Kempenfelt, whom Cornish sent
‘with my dispatches, and [who] will have the Honour to present to you some Coppar [sic]
Plates of the Philippine Islands, that were found in Manila.’19
To be sure, observers in the Spanish Empire would not have known precisely what
British officers were doing with the intelligence objects they had taken from Manila’s
archives or the Santísima Trinidad. Nonetheless, even during the war they inferred
from British actions a desire for further conquests. Thus Gómez implored Arriaga in 1763:
to repair the breaks that the Capital Manila, and its dependencies suffer, to assure its future
conservation, and stem the advances that the English are making in these parts […] I find
myself feeling even that the English, after the taking of Manila, informed themselves of
the individual transits that there are from the Port of Acapulco to the Capital Mexico,
perhaps to install themselves in that Reign; in addition to notoriously making clear to me
that in the year just past 7 English frigates left Jolo, 5 to reconnoitre the coasts of New
Figure 2. Hipólito Ximénez after Antonio Fernández de Roxas, Topographia de la ciudad de Manila,
capital de las yslas Philipinas, ca. 1739.
© British Library Board, Maps K.Top.116.40.
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Spain, and 2, for the discovery of the Reign of the South, the Salomon Islands, and lands of
Fernando Gallego […] if they extend their Conquests to these parts there will not be a single
point of repose in all of the Coasts of the Americas.
As this suggests, even though the British expedition to Manila originated from India,
Gómez imagined the future threat posed by Britain in expansively transpacific terms.20
Moreover, British actions even after their withdrawal fromManila gave credence to the
spectre of continued British belligerence. In mid-1764, John Byron—another Anson
alumnus—made the first British circumnavigation since Anson’s, claiming the Falkland
Islands along the way. As Geoffrey Rice argues, in this context both Spain and France
took the view that Britain might recapture Manila, leading Spain to cancel the annual
sailing in 1766 (Rice 1980). Such an assault never materialised, but even as late as 1796,
Whitehall still contemplated attacking the city from India, if not via the transpacific:
when peace between Napoleonic France and Spain sparked yet another Anglo-Spanish
War, the administration of William Pitt the Younger (1783–1801; 1804–1806) hatched
a plan, proposed through the Secret Committee of the East India Company, for an
expedition ‘to dispossess the Spaniards of Manilla.’21
The breaking and remaking of Manila
Following the calamities of 1762, the administration of Carlos III pursued a broad-based
programme of securitisation on both sides of the Pacific and in the zone around Havana.
This securitisation had many dimensions, but among them there was a strong attachment
to the built environment as an instrument of security. Thus in the eastern Pacific, building
projects were pursued such as the establishment of a new naval base at San Blas and the
construction of Franciscan missions in new California.
Less familiar, but as profound, was the transformation of Manila. There, the British
invasion unleashed a post-war security panic, promoted by military engineers and by
royal officials. By encouraging their superiors in Spain to attribute the fall of Manila to
spatial and material defects in its form—and to see continued risk in that form—these offi-
cials gained permission significantly to amplify the walled city’s fortifications, while razing
historic buildings and clearing neighbourhoods in the extramural corridor. This process
disproportionately affected both the multi-ethnic inhabitants of towns such as Bagumba-
yan (which was home, as Concepción put it, to ‘Españoles, Yndios, Sangleyes, o Chinos,
Criollos, Morenos, Negros, y Castizos de todos ellos’) and the religious orders.22
To be sure, this dynamic relationship between insecurity and architectural destruction
—and even architectural destruction in Extramuros—was not new at this time. As Dana
Leibsohn has written, during a panic caused by fear of a possible invasion by the Chinese
military leader Koxinga in 1662, ‘the Japanese residents of Manila […] with the Spaniards
and […] indigenous allies […] dismantled all major stone structures outside of, but close
to, the city walls. By destroying these buildings, they reasoned, Koxinga and his men would
be denied strongholds from which to attack the city. Churches in Dilao, the Parian, and
Bagumbaya, the country houses of the Spaniards, and the Hospital de los Naturales
(San Lázaro) were all taken down’ (Leibsohn 2014, 242). And, only decades before that
in 1642, when faced with the threat of attack on the city by the ‘Dutch enemy,’ the gov-
ernor Sebastián Hurtado de Corcuera ordered the destruction of the church and
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convent of San Juan Bautista de Bagumbayan over the objections of the Augustinian
Recollects, who insisted that if the Dutch came ‘the Religious themselves would mount
the Walls, with their linstocks, and help the Artillerymen to pull down the Convent.’23
The difference is that these seventeenth-century security panics were generally short-
lived, and followed by periods of reconstruction; for example with the support of city offi-
cials, the Recollects were able to regain control of the demolition site in Bagumbayan,
obtain funds to rebuild, and return by 1652.24 Hence before 1762 Manila retained, or
regained, a composite urban form that brought extramural towns almost to the city
walls. And, as a corollary, the retention of this built form also meant that the social and
political characteristics that attended that form also persisted. One of these, again observed
by Leibsohn, was the fact that the ‘boundary between Intramuros and Extramuros was
porous in lived reality’ (Leibsohn 2014, 236)—a permeability and flow whose persistence
into the eighteenth century is evocatively suggested by Roxas’s ‘Topographia de la ciudad
de Manila,’ with its depictions of people coursing on foot, in boats, and sometimes in car-
riages along the Calzada, through the wetlands of San Lázaro, and over numerous bridges
including the bridge over the Pasig, the bridge emanating from the Parián gate, and the
gate linking the walled city to Bagumbayan. Another characteristic, also discernible
from Roxas, was the contiguity between the intramural compounds of the religious
orders and their extramural parishes. From the vantage point of Nuestra Señora de los
Angeles, for example, the Franciscans would have been able to take in a panoramic
view of the town of Dilao—an extramural town initially established as a Franciscan
parish for emigrant Japanese, but by the eighteenth century home to a complex mix of
people similar to Bagumbayan’s—and likely see their church and convent there.
In contrast, the security panic sparked by the British occupation fuelled a period of
breaking and remaking that (despite periodic interruptions) persisted for half a century.
And, although the U.S. invasion would spark another radical transformation to
Manila’s urbanscape that—among many other changes—saw significant rebuilding in
the zone beyond the walled city, for the rest of the period of Spanish rule Extramuros
remained a security zone to which people, dwellings, churches, and hospitals did not
return.
Panic
After the war, it was only natural that those with a stake in the rule and defence of Manila
should seek explanations as to what had gone wrong, but two substantially different and
competing narratives emerged to explain the failures of security that had taken place. One
account was provided by the Franciscan provincial Roque de la Purificación, one of several
religious whom Anda had enlisted for support in the campaign against the British, who
wrote to the king in July of 1764 from his convent in Dilao. In it, he repeatedly emphasised
the willingness of religious and indigenous people to fight the British—in sharp contrast to
the city’s Spaniards. Thus he offered the following chilling and accusatory narrative:
With a rude breach the enemy took the Plaza by assault the fifth day of October, and found it
so helpless, and the facade of the rampart so deserted, that not one Soldier could witness the
scene of how the English mounted it. So much terror and horror had already come to us, my
Lord, that the previous night, seeing that the breach was becoming practicable, and that the
cannons of that Bastion were being lost because they were falling into the ditch, the Religious
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of all the Communities, they alone, with the Natives, dragged themselves to the safest part
with the intention of covering the breach with timber, sandbags, and other bits of wood,
but they were impeded by the Engineer, who said that it was solely his job to do these
repairs. Because they found no resistance they occupied all of the posts of the Rampart,
and were picking off people in the streets, this forced the Indians of the garrison to run in
all directions. And in this way, many of them drowned in the River, fleeing the fire
coming from the Wall.
As this suggests, the Franciscan’s account put human failure—and specifically the failures
of ‘Soldiers,’ ‘the Engineer,’ and other Crown personnel charged with the city’s defence—at
the heart of the fall of Manila.25
Not surprisingly, engineers and Crown officials presented an alternative version of
events, highlighting instead how the city’s problematic urban and architectural form
had undermined (and continued to threaten) its security. Both de la Torre and Gómez
promoted this materialist interpretation, emphasising the detrimental role played by
two extramural churches that the British had occupied in their assault on the city walls.
From this example, de la Torre extrapolated the security risk posed by other extramural
churches. ‘The English destroyed both Churches of S. Tiago and Bagumbaya, leaving
only a confused pile of ruins,’ he wrote to Arriaga in July of 1764, ‘but on the same
shore, within Cannon’s reach, remain the Churches of la Hermita, and Malate, and by
land, skirting the city are the Churches of San Lazaro Dilao, San Miguel, [and] that of
the Parián of the Sangleyes, all within rifle range [of the walled city] and also the
Church of Binondo, excessively built for its strength and outsized grandeur, and the Hos-
pital of San Gabriel which is a rifle shot from the Wall, and the Church of Tondo[.]’With
this ‘circle of extramural strongholds,’ de la Torre warned, ‘the City will always be exposed
from its foundations in any Invasion to being taken by the Enemy.’26
As this indicates, those who attributed culpability for the city’s fall to material
deficiencies tended to project that risk forward, and to argue that Manila’s future protec-
tion depended upon profound changes to its built fabric. Hence in 1764 Gómez, under de
la Torre’s patronage, submitted a proposal to the king outlining how architectural and
engineering works would put the city into a ‘state of defence’ (Figure 3). This proposal
included a written report, but also a detailed visual ‘Plan of the plaza of Manila and Archi-
pelago of San Lazaro’ which presented the proposed changes in succinct visual form (and
which invited the king to visualise both the defective, existing city and its transformed,
secure alternative) by rendering the features of the existing city in dotted lines, while indi-
cating ‘with solid lines a new plan of fortifications to place the said plaza in a state of
defence.’ As Gómez put it in his accompanying account, a ‘simple inspection of [his]
plan’ could express much more than all of the ‘wordy reports could do.’27
Although this trope was not new, Gómez’s appeal to the plan’s visual simplicity perhaps
deflected attention from how radical it was in two, intersecting respects. First, it called for a
reimagining of the city not in the way that previous mapmakers, notably Roxas, had rep-
resented it—that is, as a living city thickly inhabited by people in motion—but rather as an
inert composite of structures and spaces. Second, it proposed not only new construction in
the enhancement of fortifications, but also architectural destruction. Thus in Gómez’s car-
tographical vision, the solid lines of the new city protruded into and overwrote existing
structures, settlements, and thoroughfares. Among these overwritten places—all depicted
in Roxas’s topography as thronged with people, but in Gómez’s plan as empty—were
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buildings in the Parián (which was home to a substantial Dominican complex as well as
the homes, businesses, and cemetery of its Chinese community); much of the part of the
Pueblo de Dilao located inside the Estero de San Lázaro; most of the Pueblo de Bagumba-
yan (including ‘the burnt Church and Convent of San Juan de Bagumbayan, belonging to
the Recollect Fathers, whose sacristy the British occupied after demolition’); and the city’s
two circum-mural routes: the waterway of the Archipelago de San Lázaro and the Calzada.
Moreover, in his accompanying report, Gómez advocated architectural destruction well
beyond the removal even of the overwritten structures: ‘It might be […] convenient,’ he
wrote, ‘for your Majesty to demolish the Churches, and the neighbourhoods that ring
the Plaza, and that are located within range of Cannon shot.’28
As this indicates, although Gómez’s plan clearly carried immense social, cultural, and
political implications, his case for interpreting Manila’s vulnerability in this way—and for
using architectural destruction to mitigate Manila’s past and present weakness—largely
depended on spatial arguments regarding the city’s form. Hence he repeated de la
Torre’s alarmist phraseology describing the churches’ location as ‘only a shot away’
from the walled city—‘a tiro de fucil del Muro,’ ‘no sale del alcanze del Cañón,’ ‘dentro
del alcance del tiro de Cañon,’ ‘alcance del Tiro del Cañon de la Plaza,’ in its various for-
mulations. This phraseology took on a life of its own, to the extent that more than a decade
Figure 3. Miguel Antonio Gómez, Plano de la Plaza de Manila capital de las Philipinas, y Archipiélago de
Sn. Lázaro: Va designado con lineas fuertes un nuevo proyecto de fortificaciones para poner dicha Plaza en
estado de defenza, 1764. Spain. Ministerio de Educación, Cultura y Deporte. Archivo General de Indias,
MP-Filipinas,160.
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later, it was still in use by Gómez’s successors such as Dionisio Kelly, an Irish veteran of
Spain’s invasion of Portugal during the Seven Years’ War. Incidentally, Kelly also became
caught up in the next Anglo-Spanish conflict, the U.S. War of Independence, when he
attempted to return to Spain from Manila aboard the Santa Inés in 1779 and was taken
prisoner of war during its capture.29
In addition to foregrounding spatial arguments regarding the proximity of churches to
the city walls, advocates of securitisation through architectural destruction also contended
that there was danger in the material fabric of extramural churches, bridges, and, in the
case of the Parián, other buildings made of stone. While la Torre described churches as
‘extramural forts,’ and censured the ‘strength and outsized grandeur’ of the Binondo
complex, for example, his successor, Feliciano Márquez, seems to have suffered from a
fear of masonry, reciting a list of all the stone and brick structures outside the walls
—‘The Convent of Dilao, and Hospital of S. Lazaro, are large Buildings of Cut Stone situ-
ated 475 varas from the curtain of defence. They dominate the Bastions of San Lorenzo
and San Andres’—and imagining the dangers they posed: the two stone bridges ‘of
Dilao and San Lazaro,’ for instance, ‘could serve as refuges for hidden Enemies.’
Further, they proposed a material remedy to this material risk. De la Torre, for
example, argued that, following the demolition of stone churches, new ones be built
only in cane and straw—vernacular building materials which Spaniards had chosen on
previous occasions to replace stone because of their flexibility during earthquakes, but
whose advantage, from the perspective of the security panic, was that they were easily
destroyed in case of attack. Or, as de la Torre put it, ‘they burn, and do not impede
defence.’ While such a claim was not untrue in a strictly material sense, the assumptions
it embedded (for example, that extramural buildings ought to burn easily) were also
matters of judgment that were open to interpretation—interpretation that could have
been based not only on the material or spatial characteristics of the city, but also on
wider questions. For example, did the potential security risk of a precise repeat of the
British breach outweigh the real cultural loss incurred by not rebuilding San Juan Bautista
de Bagumbayan, which Concepción had described before the war as a ‘refuge, and spiritual
Comfort for’ the ‘variety of nations’ who lived there? And, given the fierce, although
unsuccessful, defence of Bagumbayan that its population had mounted—and given
Anda’s generalised success in pushing back the British in places outside the city walls by
forging alliances that included religious such as Purificación and indigenous people—was
a materialist strategy of fortifying the walled city and demolishing extramural ‘forts’ prefer-
able to an alternative based on the improved use of human resources and alliances?30
This is not to say that the engineers envisioned preserving the dwellings and other
buildings that were inhabited by the extramural towns’ ‘Yndios y Mestizos.’ Rather,
they viewed such architecture, made of cane [caña] and bamboo [nipa], as too disposable
even to require representation: ‘Note that this Plan does not designate the Islands of
thatched houses surrounding the city,’ wrote Gómez in the cartouche to the left of his
1764 plan, ‘because the intention was only to show those of masonry, so that a clear under-
standing will arise of how damaging these buildings are, and of the need to demolish those
within cannon shot, without which precaution the Plaza will always be lost whenever
enemies lay siege.’31
Once set in motion, the multifaceted process of securitisation through cartography,
architecture, and engineering initiated by Gómez and de la Torre proceeded for another
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half-century—intensified, perhaps, by the tendency of Gómez’s successors to disparage the
state of the defences as they found them, and to put their own stamp on the ongoing work.
Hence Márquez complained about the ‘ruinous state’ of the fort and the ‘deplorable state’
of the Plaza. And hence Kelly (who described the old counterscarp as ‘defective to its situ-
ation’) implemented the creation of an additional perimeter even beyond that proposed in
Gómez’s plan. In this, amplified project, Kelly created a sluice gate and breakwater that
diverted the tide into a second, exterior moat [contrafoso], as well as another earthen
barrier beyond it.32
While Gómez’s successors may have expanded upon his plan, however, they generally
worked within his cartographical and architectural template. Márquez’s 1767 ‘Plan of the
current state of the plaza of Manila and its surroundings and suburbs’ also presented the
city in his terms, rather than those articulated by Roxas. Thus while it continued to indi-
cate many of the landmark buildings of the pre-war extramural landscape (notably, the
Parish and Convent of the Parian [no. 18], the Convent and Parish of Dilao [no. 20],
the Hospital of San Lázaro [no. 22], the ‘ruined Convent of S. Juan de Bagumbaya’ [no.
23] and the ‘destroyed Parish of San Tiago [no. 24]’), it did not present the zones
within which these buildings were situated as living townscapes or as elements of a
dense built fabric—with the exception of the parish and convent of Parián, which it pre-
sented as densely built, if not inhabited. Rather, the 1767 plan presents the entire extra-
mural corridor bounded by the Bay of Manila, the Calzada, and the Estero de San
Lázaro (again with the exception of the Parián) as blank spaces, or spaces with a
dotting of vegetation. Indeed, even more ominously than Gómez, Márquez wrote of
these areas that ‘In the adjoining Map I omit the houses of the Indians, which being of
canes and bamboos (combustible material) form the Pueblos bordering the Churches
of Hermita, Dilao, S. Miguel, S. Anton, the Parian, Santa Cruz, Binondoc, and Tondo
drawn there.’33
In this period, the process of razing those landmark buildings also began. Among the
first casualties were the Santiago parish church and San Juan Bautista de Bagumbayan. In
1769 military officials removed them along with the town of Bagumbayan, leaving what
Kelly approvingly called a ‘cleared space’ (Figure 4). This was repeated throughout the
extramural corridor. Although Kelly grudgingly marked on his map that the similarly ‘pre-
judicial suburb of the Parian’ and its church still existed in 1775 along with the districts of
San Miguel, Dilao, and San Lázaro, it too was cleared. This may be seen by referring to
Thomas Sanz’s 1783 ‘Plan showing works executed in the plaza of Manila in the years
1783 and preceding No. 2.’ On this are specified both the ‘demolished Houses of the
Parian’ [H] and a ‘Bridge serving no purpose, which had to be destroyed’ [R]. In the
latter case, this representation of the destruction of the bridge also effectively enacted a
kind of ‘destruction of memory,’ in Robert Bevan’s phrase (2006), seeing as the bridge,
in fact, formerly had served a useful role: linking the inner portion of the Pueblo de
Dilao (and the walled city itself) to the outer part of the town, to Dilao’s Franciscan
convent and church, and to the Pueblo de San Miguel.34
To be sure, these too would be demolished, as may be seen from a 1795 map by
Gregorio Clavero in which all that remained of the Franciscan church at Dilao was a
dotted outline and all traces removed of its companion building, the Hospital of San
Lázaro. These institutions would be replaced by a new Hospital of San Lázaro (constructed
north of the river on formerly Jesuit territory) and a new parish and pueblo of San
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Figure 4. Dionisio Kelly, Plano de los contornos, porcion de costa, y Bahía adyacentes a la ciudad y Plaza de Manila, Capital de las Yslas Philipinas. Manuscript map on
paper roll, 1775.

















Fernando de Dilao, established farther inland, at modern-day Paco. Despite these replace-
ments, however, the extramural world ceased to exist. By the opening of the nineteenth
century, all that remained was a blank security crescent, fittingly described in an 1814
map as ‘terrenos adictos a la fortificación’ (Figure 5).35
Because so much more analysis has been devoted to trade than to war in the Pacific, it
would be too soon to make any final conclusions on the relationships between eighteenth-
century Anglo-Spanish conflict and either economic or cultural change. There are many
important subjects that this essay has not been able to consider: for instance, the roles
played by local people in the breaking and remaking of Manila; or the responses of the
city’s inhabitants to its partitioning and to the processes that attended it, for instance the relo-
cation and consolidation of extramural towns and parishes. How, for example, did the
process of architectural destruction unleashed by the Seven Years’ War transform social
relationships in Manila, and the relationships between place, space, and memory? And,
moving beyond the eighteenth century, it is possible to view the establishment of the security
crescent not only as an act of destruction, but also as an act of creation—and to ask what
kinds of meanings, memories, and relationships it generated in the final century of
Spanish colonial rule. These are questions that future scholarship might consider.36
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de guerra,’ 23 Dec. 1795, AGI MP-Filipinas,188.
36. For discussion in other contexts see Herscher 2010; Mancini and Breshanan 2015.
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